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DELIVER US FROM EVIL: WHY BANKRUPTCY
JUDGES MAY PROPERLY RELY ON THE FREE
EXERCISE CLAUSE & RFRA TO PROTECT
CHURCH PROPERTY FROM THE GRASPS OF
TORT-CREDITORS
Nicholas M. Gaunce∗
Robert Luther III∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In January of 2002, the Boston Globe reported that the Boston
Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church had knowingly transferred
at least one sexually abusive priest between several parishes within the
region.1 This report lit a powder keg of sexual abuse allegations against
Roman Catholic clergy throughout the country.2 Reports have indicated
that the Catholic Church has spent over a billion dollars to settle claims
brought by alleged sexual abuse victims.3 As a result of this unexpected
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1
Daniel J. Marcinak, Comment, Separation of Church and Estate: On Excluding Parish
Assets from the Bankruptcy Estate of a Diocese Organized as a Corporation Sole, 55 CATH. U. L.
REV. 583, 584 n.10 (2006) (citing Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at A1). However, the genesis of parish closings in and around
Boston actually antedates the scandal. See Kathy McCabe, As Parishes Close, Survivors Plot
Future, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1998, at 4 (discussing, in 1998, the Archdiocesan plans to
close several dozen parishes through “2008 because of declining attendance and shrinking
numbers of clergy[]”); see also The Boston Globe, http://www.boston.com/globe/
spotlight/abuse/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (discussing relevant issues regarding the
Catholic Church sex abuse scandal, including internal church documents, victim letters,
financial cost analysis, and various links to news stories).
2
Marcinak, supra note 1, at 584.
3
Id. at n.12 (citing Rachel Zoll, Sex Abuse-Related Costs Top $ 1 Billion, MIAMI HERALD,
June 10, 2005, at A1, 2005 WLNR 9200385) (explaining that between 2002 and mid-2005, the
church spent at least $378 million defending against sex-abuse claims).
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financial upheaval, several dioceses threatened to file for bankruptcy.4
However, the first dioceses to actually file Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petitions were the dioceses of Tucson, Arizona; Portland, Oregon; and
Spokane, Washington.5
From a bankruptcy law perspective, “[b]ecause no American diocese
had ever filed for bankruptcy protection, this area of the law involve[d]
totally uncharted waters.”6 Therefore, when claims of clergy abuse arose
in the states of Oregon and Washington,7 bankruptcy courts in these
jurisdictions were required to determine whether property titled in the
name of the diocese, but held in trust for parishes within the dioceses,
could be excluded from the bankruptcy estate of the diocese on First
Amendment or Religious Freedom Restoration Act, (“RFRA”), grounds.8
Both courts held that neither the First Amendment nor RFRA barred
including parish property in the estate of the diocese.9 In effect, the
courts required churches to abide by secular principles of law when
holding church property.10

Id. at 585.
Id. See also 7-1100 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 1100.01 (15th ed. rev. 2006). Collier describes the basic Chapter 11 policies as follows:
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides an opportunity for a
debtor to reorganize its business or financial affairs or to engage in an
orderly liquidation of its property. It is fashioned primarily for
business debtors, although individuals who are not engaged in
businesses qualify for relief under Chapter 11.
Chapter 11 embodies a policy that it is generally preferable to
enable a debtor to continue to operate and to reorganize its business
rather than simply to liquidate a troubled business. Continued
operation may enable the debtor to preserve any positive difference
between the going concern value of the business and the liquidation
value. Moreover, continued operation can save the jobs of employees,
the tax base of communities, and generally reduce the upheaval that
can result from termination of a business.
Id. (footnote omitted).
6
Marcinak, supra note 1, at 585 (citing Eli Sanders, Catholics Puzzle over a Bankruptcy
Filing, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2004, at A17) (quoting Bud Bunce, communications director for
the Archdiocese of Portland) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005);
In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), overruled by
Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006)).
8
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 860; In re the Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 324.
9
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. 868; In re the Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 325.
10
Id.; see also Joseph A. Rohner IV, Comment, Catholic Diocese Sexual Abuse Suits,
Bankruptcy, and Property of the Bankruptcy Estate: Is the “Pot of Gold” Really Empty?, 84 OR. L.
REV. 1181 (2005) (detailing the civil law protections available to church entities).
4
5
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This Article challenges the Oregon Bankruptcy Court’s decision in In
re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland and the Washington Bankruptcy
Court’s decision in In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane. Specifically, it
argues that there are two separate bases for bankruptcy judges to utilize
a heightened level of scrutiny for the process of liquidation when they
apply traditional legal principles to render decisions that will
substantially affect church property. To logically reach this point, this
Article is subdivided into several parts. First, Part II traces a line of
Supreme Court decisions on church property disputes implicating Free
Exercise Clause concerns in the context of religious practices.11 Next,
Part III explains basic principles of bankruptcy law and analyzes the
decisions of the Oregon and Washington Bankruptcy Courts.12 Part IV
challenges the application of Employment Division v. Smith’s13 general rule
for the resolution of bankruptcy disputes; in particular, this Article
asserts that the bankruptcy system is one of individualized exemptions,
which requires bankruptcy courts to apply strict scrutiny to the process
of liquidation when deciding matters affecting church property, and
argues that RFRA does not apply to bankruptcy judges when making
state law determinations.14 Finally, this Article asserts that RFRA applies
to bankruptcy judges based on Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy
Clause of Article I of the Constitution.
The authors hope this Article will provide an analytical framework
for future cases in which bankruptcy judges are confronted with tortcreditor suits that have resulted in judgments against religious entities.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE
Two lines of precedent must be examined before the decisions of the
Washington and Oregon Bankruptcy Courts can be properly analyzed.
Beginning with Watson v. Jones, Part II.A discusses what has been
identified as the “church property” cases.15 Next, Part II.B discusses the

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
13
Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990)
(holding that neutral laws of general applicability may be upheld despite an incidental
burden on the practice of one’s religion).
14
See infra Part IV.
15
Watson v. Jones and its progeny include: Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Jones v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
11
12
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Supreme Court’s decisions in Sherbert v. Verner and its progeny, which
involved state-imposed burdens on the exercise of religious freedom.16
A. The “Church Property” Cases
The “church property” cases make it clear that the Court has often
struggled to balance the needs of the secular and religious worlds when
tasked with adjudicating church property disputes. The need to balance
first arose in 1872 with Watson v. Jones.17 Watson involved a divided
Kentucky Presbyterian congregation that had battled over the ownership
of church belongings.18 Specifically, the division in the congregation
stemmed from a disagreement over the treatment of individuals who
had previously owned slaves or served in the Confederate army during
the Civil War.19 The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church had
officially disavowed slavery and declared that those members who still
professed a belief in slavery did not reflect the “true Presbytery[.]”20
The Supreme Court held that the right of religious freedom included
the right to organize religious bodies to decide questions of faith.21 In
addition, the Court held that once a hierarchical church body had
decided a matter of internal faith, civil courts were bound to show
deference to that decision.22 Applying this rule to the dispute, the Court
concluded that the General Assembly’s decision was binding on civil
courts.23 Therefore, the property at issue belonged to the church
congregants whom the General Assembly considered to be true
members.24
Although “[t]he clear effect of Watson was to limit the role of the
courts in the resolutions of disputes over church property”25, when the
opportunity arose in Jones v. Wolf,26 the Court reconsidered the deference
it had previously shown to the church decision-making body in Watson
and suggested a second constitutionally permissible method for
resolving intra-faith property disputes. This approach evolved from the
Sherbert v. Verner and its progeny include: Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); and Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
17
Watson, 80 U.S. at 679.
18
Id. at 681.
19
Id. at 690–92.
20
Id. at 692.
21
Id. at 729.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 727.
24
Id. at 692.
25 Paul Finkelman, ed. Religion in American Law: An Encyclopedia, “Departure from
Doctrine” by Davison M. Douglas & James K. Lehman, 135 (1999).
26
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
16
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seed planted by the Court just three years earlier in Presbyterian Church in
the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church,27 a case which actually affirmed many of the principles of Watson
and held that the civil trial judge had overstepped his authority by
charging the jury to draw interpretations and conclusions significantly
interwoven with church doctrine.28
Jones involved an intra-congregational dispute regarding separation
from a governing authority.29 Members of the local congregation were
divided over the decision to separate.30 In response to the division, the
congregation’s higher authority enacted a commission that issued a
written ruling declaring the minority faction, who favored continuing a
relationship with the higher authority, the true congregation.31
Following the ruling, the minority faction brought suit in federal court
seeking exclusive possession of the disputed church property.32
To resolve this controversy, the Jones Court applied the “neutralprinciples approach” which had been first mentioned in Hull.33 Under
this approach, secular courts are allowed to resolve internal church
disputes by applying neutral principles of trust or property law.34 Given
this holding, courts can apply general legal principles to church deeds,
charters, and constitutions.35 Today, the Jones decision stands for the
proposition that a civil court may set aside decisions made by a
congregation with regard to its internal affairs if the decision affects
church property and the court applies “neutral principles” of trust or
property law in determining the distribution of church assets.36 Today,
the specific limitations from Jones remain undefined, as Justice Powell
predicted in his dissent.37 Nevertheless, it is important to keep these

Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Hospital, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
28
Id.
29
Jones, 443 U.S. at 597.
30
Id. at 598.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 604.
34
Id. at 603.
35
Id. at 604.
36
Jones, 443 U.S. at 610 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court appears to accept
established principles that I have thought would resolve this case, it superimposes on these
principles a new structure of rules that will make the decision of these cases by civil courts
more difficult. The new analysis also is more likely to invite intrusion into church polity
forbidden by the First Amendment.”).
37
See Jeffrey B. Hassler, Comment, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal
Resolution of Church Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife, 35
PEPP. L. REV. 399, 428–29 (2008) (stating that “the neutral-principles doctrine may not be the
27
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cases in mind as we contemplate the role of the bankruptcy judge in the
context of tort-creditor claimants who demand the distribution of church
property to satisfy a judgment.
B. Sherbert: The Pinnacle of Free Exercise
In addition to Watson, Hull, and Jones, Sherbert v. Verner38 and its
progeny provide other principles for consideration. In Sherbert, a
Seventh-Day Adventist was fired from her job after refusing to work on
Saturday, her Sabbath.39
When Mrs. Sherbert applied for state
unemployment compensation, her application was denied because her
religious objection to working on Saturday did not create “good cause”
for her refusal to work.40 The Supreme Court disagreed with this denial
and held that Mrs. Sherbert was entitled to unemployment
compensation.41 The Court reasoned that the government placed a
substantial burden on Mrs. Sherbert’s religious freedom by requiring her
to make a choice between forfeiting government benefits and violating a
central tenet of her faith.42 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
announced that the government had to meet the standard of strict
scrutiny if it planned to deny applicants religious exemptions from
facially-neutral laws.43
This standard, however, was substantially modified in Employment
Division v. Smith.44 Smith, a Native American, was seeking state
unemployment compensation after being fired for ingesting peyote—a
criminally banned substance in the state of Oregon—during a Native
American religious ceremony.45
The Supreme Court effectively
overruled Sherbert in holding that Smith was not entitled to an
exemption from the Oregon drug law because that law was a neutral law
of general applicability and not subject to the exacting review of strict
scrutiny.46
panacea” of all church property issues as anticipated by the majority in Jones[]”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
38
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
39
Id. at 399.
40
Id. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41
Id. at 402.
42
Id. at 406.
43
Id. at 406 (“We must next consider whether some compelling state interest . . . justifies
the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right.”). A similar broad
protection of religious freedom was recognized in Yoder, where the Court held that Amish
children were not required to attend the ninth and tenth grade despite Wisconsin’s
compulsory attendance law. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972).
44
Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
45
Id. at 874.
46
Id. at 890.
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In 1993, Congress responded to the Smith ruling by enacting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, (“RFRA”), in an attempt to restore
the Sherbert holding.47 Under RFRA, in order for one to assert a valid
free exercise claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a government
regulation “substantially burden[s]” his or her religious practice.48 Once
the plaintiff satisfies this burden, the government must assert a
compelling interest to support its regulation.49 Despite this landmark
congressional response, in the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state laws,
based on federalism and separation of powers concerns.50
III. THE PRELUDE TO THE DECISIONS OF THE OREGON AND WASHINGTON
BANKRUPTCY COURTS
This Part provides an overview of the traditional scope of the
bankruptcy estate and briefly explains how church property is
traditionally held by a Catholic diocese.51 In light of this discussion, the
decisions of In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland and In re the
Catholic Bishop of Spokane are then analyzed.52
A. The Bankruptcy Estate and the Trust Exception
Now that controlling precedent has been reviewed, it is appropriate
to briefly review the recent decisions of the Washington and Oregon
Bankruptcy Courts. At issue in both cases was the application of Section
541 of the Bankruptcy Code which governs the scope of the bankruptcy
estate.53 In fact, this provision embodies one of the basic principles
supporting bankruptcy law.54 In short, after a debtor files a petition,
Section 541 creates a separate estate that holds the debtor’s property
interests during the administration of the bankruptcy case.55 This
provision serves to centralize the debtor’s property interests by requiring
creditors to receive satisfaction of their debts through a single court.56 To

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
Id. § 2000bb-1(a).
49
Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
50
521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
51
See infra Parts III.A–B.
52
See infra Parts III.B.1–2
53
11 U.S.C. § 541 (2005).
54
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 5, at § 541.01 (declaring that “Section 541 embodies the
essence of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
55
51 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 51:3 (2d ed.
2006).
56
Id.
47
48
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meet this end, Section 541 broadly defines the term “property of the
estate[.]”57 In relevant part, this section explicitly states: the bankruptcy
estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case . . . wherever located and by
whomever held[.]”58 In plain English, the estate includes any interest,
wherever that interest is located.59
Section 541’s scope, however, is not unlimited. In fact, the provision
lists six categories of property that are excluded from a bankruptcy
estate.60 The particular exception at issue in both of the aforementioned
church-property bankruptcy cases was § 541(d). This section excludes,
from the bankruptcy estate, property in which the debtor “holds, as of
the commencement of the case, only legal title and not an equitable
interest[.]”61 It was precisely this provision of the Bankruptcy Code that
both the Oregon and Washington dioceses relied upon to support their
position that church property should be excluded from the estate
because the parish—not the diocese—was the equitable owner of the
property.
B. The Corporation Sole and Canon Law
Before evaluating the position of the dioceses, it is important to note
that the exclusion proposition presented by the church had a legitimate
basis in current church structure and Canon Law. Regarding church
structure, Catholic dioceses are either modeled in corporation sole or
corporation aggregate form.62 Both the Oregon and Washington
dioceses adopted the corporate sole structure.63 This structure is unique
because it consists of one individual and his or her successors, by virtue
of an office position, assuming the legal capacity of a corporation.64 The
focus of this model is to fashion an “official trusteeship” whereby one
central entity, such as a bishop or diocese, holds purely legal title to
church property and several constituent entities, such as parishes, enjoy
11 U.S.C. § 541 (2005).
Id. § 541(a)(1).
59
See id.; Norton, supra note 55, at § 51:1.
60
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 5, at § 541.01.
61
11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (2005).
62
Felicia Anne Nadborny, Note, “Leap of Faith” into Bankruptcy: An Examination of the
Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic Diocese’s Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 839, 848 (2005).
63
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842, 860 (Bankr. D. Or.
2005); In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 324 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005),
overruled by Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D.
Wash. 2006).
64
1 JAMES D. COX, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 1.19 (2d ed. 1995).
57
58
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an equitable interest in that property.65 In essence, this structure imposes
a model whereby the central authority holds property on behalf of the
constituency, and a trust is created for the benefit of the congregation’s
constituency.66
This is hardly a novel concept; the church often holds property in
trust for its congregation. In fact, this concept is rooted in Canon Law
and arises from a very pragmatic purpose. The corporate sole structure
developed as a way for parishes to restrict the diocese from controlling
property that the parish purchased separately.67 Under this structure, if
a diocese attempted to subrogate parish property, Canon Law would be
violated.68 Essentially, Canon Law recognizes each individual parish as
a separate legal entity.69 More importantly, however, Canon Law
recognizes that once a parish acquires assets with separate funds and in
a separate capacity, the diocese is required to respect this separate
acquisition and restrain itself from claiming an interest in the acquired
property.70 Despite this recognition, neither the Washington nor the
Oregon Bankruptcy Court was responsive to these acknowledgements
during litigation.
In each case, a local archdiocese filed a voluntary bankruptcy
petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.71 Both dioceses listed
parish property as property held in trust for another entity, namely the
parishes themselves.72 In response to this listing, the Tort Claimants’
Committee filed an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration that
parish property was included within the diocese bankruptcy estate.73 In
both cases, the church, focusing on section 541(d), argued that the
Id.
Id.
67
JAMES A. CORIDEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW (Revised) 175 (2004); see also
CODE OF CANON LAW c.1255 (stating that “[t]he universal Church and the Apostolic See,
the particular churches as well as any other juridic person, whether public or private, are
capable of acquiring, retaining, administering[,] and alienating temporal goods in accord
with the norm of law[]”).
68
Coriden, supra note 67, at 175.
69
Id.
70
Id.; see also CODE OF CANON LAW C. 1256 (stating that “[t]he right of ownership over
goods under the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff belongs to that juridic person
which has lawfully acquired them[]”).
71
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842, 848 (Bankr. D. Or.
2005); In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005),
overruled by Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D.
Wash. 2006)).
72
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 848; In re the Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 310.
73
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 850; In re the Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 310.
65
66
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parish—not the diocese—was the equitable owner of parish property.74
Both courts rejected this argument, holding that parish property was
included in the bankruptcy estate.75 Furthermore, the courts rejected a
religious freedom defense to the proceeding which was presented by the
church in each respective case.76
1.

The Oregon Bankruptcy Court Decision

In the Oregon litigation, the Portland diocese argued, based on a
First Amendment claim, that the court should “apply internal church
law to determine what is property of the bankruptcy estate.”77 The
court, relying on Jones, held that neutral principles of state law could be
applied to determine whether church property was included in the
bankruptcy estate.78 In so holding, the court clearly stated that
“consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence and the Bankruptcy
Code, [we] will apply neutral secular principles of state law[.]”79
However, the RFRA argument that the Portland diocese put forth
garnered a lengthier discussion of applicable principles from the court.
After stating the prevailing standards, the court asserted that RFRA did
not apply to § 541 determinations.80 In fact, the court’s position was that
bankruptcy judges are unrestrained by RFRA when making estate
determinations because the reviewing judge applies state law to render
those decisions.81 However, the court, to further its analysis, assumed
that RFRA would apply.82
In this decision, the court did not extend its holding beyond the
initial hurdle which required that the church prove a substantial burden
on its religious freedom. The court explicitly stated that “[i]t is hard to
understand how the court’s determination of what constitutes property
of the bankruptcy estate under § 541 could impose a substantial burden
on the exercise of religion.”83 In other words, as long as secular law
provided the church an opportunity to hold property in a manner that

Nadborny, supra note 62, at 850–53.
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 868; In re the Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 333.
76
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 850; In re the Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 310.
77
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 335 B.R. at 853.
78
Id. at 852.
79
Id. at 854.
80
Id. at 861.
81
Id. at 860.
82
Id. at 860–61.
83
Id. at 861.
74
75
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honored its religious tenets, no burden on religious practice was
imposed.84
2.

The Washington Bankruptcy Court Decision

Like the Oregon court, the Washington Bankruptcy Court was
unreceptive to the church’s arguments. There, the church took the firm
stance and argued that the application of civil law, to any extent, would
interfere with the free exercise of religion.85 To support this theory, the
Spokane bishop first raised the “church property” line of cases. In
response, the bankruptcy court noted the potential application of this
precedent to the present dispute, but distinguished the cases.86 First, the
court reasoned that the “church property” cases involved intra-church
disputes, and, by contrast, the instant case involved a dispute between
the church and third-party tort victims.87 Here, the court determined
that deference to church autonomy was not warranted in a third-party
creditor-church relationship.88
In addition, the Washington court considered the application of
Smith and RFRA. In this portion of its analysis, the reviewing judge
focused on determining whether the application of § 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code imposed a substantial burden on the church’s free
exercise of religion—just as the Oregon court had done.89 However,
unlike the Oregon court, the Washington court emphasized that the
church was engaging in a secular activity.90 Based on this distinction, the
Washington court explicitly noted that “[r]eligious organizations do not
exist on some ethereal plane far removed from society[,]”91 but that the
church engages in secular activities, such as defaulting on a mortgage,
like other non-religious debtors.92
To the Washington court, a
bankruptcy petition is a secular activity, regardless of whether it is filed
by an individual or a church. Because this law would be applicable to
any other similarly-situated debtor, the court explained that there is no

Id. at 862.
In re the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 322 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005),
overruled by Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D.
Wash. 2006)).
86
Id. at 322–23.
87
Id. at 323.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 324.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
84
85
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burden that would give rise to a RFRA claim by the application of this
particular law to the church.93
IV. WHY THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND RFRA APPLY TO BANKRUPTCY
Consideration of both the Oregon and Washington cases makes it
clear that both dioceses were unsuccessful in persuading the bankruptcy
court to adopt either the church-property or free exercise line of
precedent; ipso facto, both courts were unreceptive to the argument that
decisions issued by bankruptcy judges which allocate church property as
the result of civil misconduct must be subjected to heightened scrutiny.
Thus, Part IV argues that both decisions were incorrect for the reasons
explained below.
A. Bankruptcy Is a System of Individualized Exemptions
First, Smith’s various holdings may provide a basis for heightening
the level of scrutiny involved in estate determinations. While Smith has
been referred to as the “death of free exercise[,]”94 commentators often
forget that Smith recognized two exceptions to its otherwise infamous
holding.95
The first exception, often referred to as the hybrid rights claim,
occurs when a plaintiff can connect a religious liberty claim to another
constitutional right.96 The second exception provides a heightened level
Id. at 325.
Stephen L. Carter, Essay, The Free Exercise Thereof, 38 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1627,
1628 n.5 (1997) (“[S]ome scholars have pessimistically declared the death of free exercise of
religion.”) (citing Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making
Sense of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 407 (1994) (arguing that
further application of the reasoning in recent Supreme Court cases would “render the Free
Exercise Clause virtually judicially dead” for minority religious practices); Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 140 (1992) (arguing that
the neutrality principle incorrectly places “the freedom of citizens to exercise their
faith . . . [at the mercy of the] vagaries of democratic politics . . . .”); Karen T. White, The
Court-Created Conflict of the First Amendment: Marginalizing Religion and Undermining the Law,
6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 186 (1994) (“In an effort to enforce government neutrality,
the Court has rendered the Free Exercise Clause almost meaningless.”)).
95
The holding in Smith was qualified by the United States Supreme Court in Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). The Lukumi decision
narrowed the Smith holding to the extent that neutral laws of general applicability, not
enacted with hostility or malice towards a particular religious group, will be upheld regardless of
the severity of the burden imposed on one’s religious practice. Evidence of such hostility
or malice employed by a legislative body toward a particular group of believers would
need to be supported by evidence in the record.
96
Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). In
Smith, the Court cited Yoder as an example of a parental right claim being combined with a
free exercise claim to satisfy the ‘hybrid rights’ exception to Smith. Id.
93
94
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of scrutiny when “a system of individual exemptions[]” has been created
to determine whether a particular individual is entitled to a secular
benefit.97 To explain the meaning of this exception, the Court cited
Sherbert as a perfect example of one such system.98 Similarly, the authors
of this Article believe that the bankruptcy system is another example of a
system of individualized exemptions.
1.

Defining a System of Individualized Exemptions

As a preliminary matter, one must first determine what qualifies as a
system of individualized exemptions. The Supreme Court, with the
exception of the Sherbert reference in Smith, has not defined this term.99
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, but with Smith clearly in
mind, a pair of recent federal courts of appeals cases have provided
guidance on the issue.
The first of these two opinions was issued by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of Blackhawk v.
Pennsylvania.100 There, the court was faced with the question of whether
the Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code, which allowed the Game
Commission to grant exemptions from a permit fee necessary to keep
wild animals in captivity, satisfied the definition of a system of
individualized exemptions.101
Based on relevant portions of the
Pennsylvania statute at issue, the Game Commission was provided the
power to refrain from charging a permit fee to an applicant when the
applicant’s posited activity provided “some other tangible benefit for the
welfare and survival of Pennsylvania’s existing wildlife population[,]”102
and when the purported use was “consistent with . . . the intent of [the
Game and Wildlife Code][.]”103
After reviewing this language, the court determined that the
Pennsylvania Game and Wildlife Code created a system of
individualized exemptions.104 Specifically, the court was persuaded by
the fact that the language of the Game and Wildlife Code permitted
exemptions when the purported use facilitated some benefit for
Pennsylvania’s existing wildlife.105 The court concluded that the

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id. at 884.
Id.
Id.
381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 209.
Id. at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
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regulation vested game officers with broad discretion to waive permit
requirements.106 Armed with this discretion, the Game and Wildlife
Code fostered “the opportunity” for a facially-neutral and generallyapplicable law to be applied in a discriminatory manner.107 Under such
circumstances, Smith’s general rule did not apply.108
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also
confronted a similar scenario. In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,109 Christiana
Axson-Flynn, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, sought an exemption from the University of Utah’s Actor
Training Program (“ATP”).110 As part of the program, Axson-Flynn was
asked to take roles that required her to say “‘goddamn’” and
“‘fucking[,]’” words that she found religiously objectionable.111 At first,
her instructors seemed receptive to her religiously-motivated objections,
but eventually pressured her to abandon them.112 Based on this
continued pressure, Axson-Flynn decided to withdraw from the
program because she believed it was only a matter of time before she
would be asked to leave.113 After her withdrawal from the program,
Axson-Flynn brought suit against the university, alleging an
infringement of her religious liberty.114
In addressing her claim, the court considered the application of the
individualized exemption doctrine to the ATP. Specifically, it found that
instructors in the program had previously granted exemptions from
specific scenes to Axson-Flynn and another student on religious
grounds.115 Based upon this, the court concluded that a question of fact
was raised as to whether the ad hoc nature of ATP’s grants of
exemptions created a system of individualized exemptions.116
With this background in perspective, we contend that when the
exception recognized in Smith is read together with the examples set
forth in Blackhawk and Axson-Flynn, it becomes clear that these opinions
accurately depict the proper criteria for a system of individualized
exemptions. In light of these facts, we propose the following simple,
two-part test:

106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
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Id.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 210.
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1281–83.
Id. at 1281–82.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1283.
Id.
Id. at 1298–99.
Id. at 1299.
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To prove that a system of individualized exemptions exists, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) there is a high level of
discretion vested in the government officer at issue, and (2)
there is some level of individualized inquiry into the reasoning
behind the applicant’s exemption request.
To understand the origins of the first part of this test, one should
review the issue before the Blackhawk court. In particular, the reader
should carefully review the Third Circuit’s critique of the broad
discretion granted to game officers whereby those officers could exempt
anyone from the Game Code if the proposed animal use was consistent
with the purposes of the Code.117
In addition, in order to understand the second prong of the test, the
reader should review the practices of the ATP in Axson-Flynn. In that
case, the program instructors questioned Axson-Flynn and the other
student who sought an exemption from the program on religious
grounds about the religious nature of that request. After reviewing the
nature of the exemption requests, the instructor had the authority to
grant or deny these requests. To the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, this was a persuasive fact that supported its conclusion that a
question of fact was created by the ad hoc nature of ATP’s grants of
exemptions.118
2.

Applying Our Two-Part Test to Bankruptcy

In the context of bankruptcy proceedings, courts should adopt a
three-step analysis. First, they should determine the identity of the
government official making the exemption determinations. Second, they
should determine the level of discretion that the identified official
possesses. Third, they should consider the individualized nature of the
inquiry that the official undertakes when rendering decisions. We will
address each step in turn.
In bankruptcy, the government decision makers are bankruptcy
judges.119 After all, the judges are the individuals who apply the
necessary body of law and reach what they consider to be a just outcome
in each case.120 Although bankruptcy judges are not the typical

Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 210 (3d Cir. 2004).
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1281–83 (noting that during the admission process, potential
students were asked about possible objections to assigned coursework).
119
Judge Patricia C. Williams decided the Washington case. Judge Elizabeth Perris
decided the Oregon case.
120
Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (upholding a bankruptcy court’s
exercise of equitable power to toll the statute of limitations on a tax debt).
117
118
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governmental decision maker under a traditional Free Exercise analysis,
the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer reminds us that judges are not
new subjects of constitutional scrutiny and can properly be labeled as
joint participants with the government to satisfy the requirement of
governmental action under the First Amendment.121
3.

The Question of Discretion: Bankruptcy Courts Are Courts of Equity
but What Does That Mean When the Debtor Is a Religious Entity?

In the second step of our analysis, a review of the bankruptcy system
and past decisions demonstrates that bankruptcy judges possess a high
level of discretion. This discretion appears historically justified in view
of the fact it has long been a maxim of bankruptcy law that bankruptcy
courts are courts of equity.122 Although the equitable powers of the
bankruptcy court have never been precisely defined, an early illustration
of the broad interpretation of this phrase is presented in Pepper v.
Litton.123
In Pepper, the Court addressed a controlling stockholder’s attempt to
defraud his corporation’s creditors through a scheme to have his
judgment lien paid first from the corporation’s assets.124 The bankruptcy
court directly disallowed this scheme by subordinating the stockholder’s
claim to that of other creditors.125
The controlling stockholder
appealed.126
In writing for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas broadly declared
that “for many purposes ‘courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of
equity, and their proceedings [are] inherently proceedings in equity.’”127
Continuing, Justice Douglas wrote
Among the granted powers are the allowance and
disallowance of claims; the collection and distribution of
the estates of bankrupts and the determination of
controversies in relation thereto; the rejection in whole
or in part “according to the equities of the case” of
claims previously allowed; and the entering of such

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that where a judicial officer enforced
a private, racially-restrictive covenant there was a denial of equal protection).
122
Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2006).
123
308 U.S. 295 (1939).
124
Id. at 297–99.
125
Id. at 296.
126
Id. at 302.
127
Id. at 304 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
121

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/5

Gaunce and Luther III: Deliver Us From Evil: Why Bankruptcy Judges May Properly Rely on

2009]

Bankruptcy Courts and Church Property

657

judgments “as may be necessary for the enforcement of
the provisions” of the act.128
Furthermore, he urged that “substance will not give way to
form[.] . . . [T]echnical considerations will not prevent substantial justice
from being done.”129 Essentially, Justice Douglas supported carte
blanche power for bankruptcy courts to do “substantial justice[.]”130
After applying those principles to the case before him, Justice Douglas
upheld the bankruptcy court’s practice of equitable subordination.131 In
strong language, Justice Douglas called it “the duty of the bankruptcy
court” to undo the scheme that the controlling stockholder created.132
Thus, within the context of these principles, he approved the bankruptcy
court’s practice of undoing a fully-perfected lien without having any
express authority to do so.133 This example shows that bankruptcy
courts not only have the authority to deny a particular governmental
benefit, but also possess the power to redefine a party’s pre-existing
rights. This breadth of discretion far exceeds that which was exercised in
either Blackhawk or Axson-Flynn.
4.

What About Individualized Inquiry: How Personal Do Bankruptcy
Courts Get?

In addressing the third part of the inquiry, it would be intellectually
dishonest to argue that bankruptcy judges do not engage in a significant
level of individualized inquiry prior to rendering decisions. There are
several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, particularly in Chapter 11,
that require a court to review the reasons behind the actor’s proposed
course of conduct.134 As announced in Smith, the controlling test
requires that the government assess “the reasons for the relevant
conduct[]” and that a “good cause” standard is sufficient to “create[] a
mechanism for individualized exemptions.”135
Proponents of applying a similar standard to bankruptcy decisions
need not search any further than section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code to
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 305.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 312.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
7 RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 5, at § 1100.01 (noting bankruptcy courts’
considerable discretion in evaluating a debtor’s use of property, borrowing of funds, and
other business decisions).
135
Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878, 884 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
128
129
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find government inquiries that mirror the good cause standard.136 One
illustration of such an inquiry occurs under the necessity of payment
doctrine—which is supported by the bankruptcy court’s section 105
powers.137 In short, this doctrine requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the
existence of a “compelling business justification, other than mere
appeasement of a major creditor[]” to validate pre-plan payment of a
pre-petition obligation.138
For instance, in In re NVR L.P., a Chapter 11 debtor wanted to make
early payments to a former employee and highly-regarded consultant.139
As a basis for its proposed action, the debtor stated that it feared that the
former employee would no longer recognize his obligation under the
non-solicitation clause, which was part of the parties’ original
employment contract.140 To address this concern, the debtor proposed to
pay the former employee an overdue bonus, but general creditors
objected to this payment.141
In reviewing the parties’ dispute, the court concluded that the threat
posed by the former employee’s potential dishonor of the nonsolicitation agreement was not a serious impediment to the Chapter 11
process.142 In so holding, it noted that the debtor’s claim was “too
remote and speculative to justify” payment under the above-mentioned
doctrine.143 Simply stated, the court found an inadequate business basis
to justify immediate payment.144
In comparison to the good cause standard, the analysis under the
necessity of payment doctrine is nearly identical. The only difference
between the standards employed is the exact wording of the inquiry. In
Smith, the Court conceded that the good cause standard invites a system
of “individualized exemptions.”145 In In re NVR L.P., the court utilized a
similar standard that can be characterized as a “good business reason”
test.146 Despite the different wording, these tests ultimately focus on the
same point. In essence, the government wants to determine whether
See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2005) (stating that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title[]”).
137
NORTON, supra note 55, at § 13.8 (citing Miltenberger v. Logansport C. & S.W.R. Co.,
106 U.S. 286 (1882)).
138
In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
139
Id. at 127.
140
Id. at 128.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 128.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Employment Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
146
In re NVR L.P., 127 B.R. at 128.
136
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there is a good reason for the private party’s proposed conduct.147 Under
either test, the third step of our proposed analysis is satisfied. Because
bankruptcy is a system of individualized exemptions, strict scrutiny
should be applied to the process of liquidation when bankruptcy courts
consider church property issues.
B. City of Boerne v. Flores: RFRA’s Application to Bankruptcy Is
Constitutional Even When State Law Standards Are Applied
This portion of the article is subdivided in several categories. First,
Part IV.B reviews the relevant post-Flores decisions. Second, the Flores
rationales are examined and applied to bankruptcy. Finally, Part IV.B
discusses the source of Congress’s extended power in bankruptcy to
make religious freedom decisions.
RFRA applies to bankruptcy decisions even when state law provides
the governing standard.148 The Oregon Bankruptcy Court directly
questioned the validity of this theory based on the notion that in order to
decide section 541 issues, bankruptcy judges have to apply state law, and
RFRA is void as to those laws.149 Implicitly, the court raised a
constitutional objection to the application of RFRA to state law
determinations.150 A proper review of Flores, post-Flores decisions, and
the special features of the Bankruptcy Clause, suggest that this
conclusion is in error.
From the outset, the circumstances under which a constitutional
challenge to RFRA’s application in bankruptcy could arise must be set
forth. To properly understand this context, one must reconsider the role
of the bankruptcy judge in these proceedings. Recall that a bankruptcy
judge applies both federal and state law in rendering his or her

Compare In re NVR L.P., 127 B.R. at 128, with Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
Vill. of Bensenville v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 457 F.3d 52, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“RFRA’s
compelling interest test remained in effect as to the federal government.”); O’Bryan v.
Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We have in the past left open the
question whether the RFRA may be applied to the internal operations of the national
government. Today we join the other circuits and hold that it may be so applied.”) (citation
omitted); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that RFRA was
applicable in the “federal realm.”); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959–60 (10th Cir.
2001) (“The invalid portion of RFRA does not alter the structure of RFRA, it simply
prevents the application of the statute to a certain class of defendants.”); In re Young, 141
F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding RFRA constitutional as applied to bankruptcy law).
149
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842, 860–61 (Bankr. D.
Or. 2005).
150
Id. at 861.
147
148
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decisions.151 In fact, the Bankruptcy Code instructs a judge to review
state law in a number of core bankruptcy areas.152
On the other hand, a closer examination of the duty to apply both
state and federal law reveals a potential conflict. One should recall that
Flores invalidated RFRA as applied to state actors applying state law.153
In view of the United States Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,154 it is clear that the postFlores RFRA decisions which held RFRA enforceable against federal
actors applying federal law155 were rightly decided. Therefore, a conflict
is apparent because a federal actor—the bankruptcy judge—must apply
state law in the discharge of his federal duties.156 This point strikes a
balance between Flores and post-Flores decisions.157
1.

Post-Flores Case Law

This conflict, however, can be resolved in examining the rationale
underlying In re Young,158 the first United States Court of Appeals
decision to be issued in the wake of Flores.159 In Young, two religious
adherents tithed ten percent of their annual income to their church.160
This practice continued when the two filed for protection under Chapter

Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 635–36
(2004) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code in over fifty locations refers to non-bankruptcy
law, applicable law, state law, or local law; in addition, noting that the two most important
terms in the Bankruptcy Code, “‘property of the estate’” and “‘creditor[,]’” are defined by
nonbankruptcy law).
152
Id.
153
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
154
546 U.S. 418 (2006) (upholding RFRA against federal actors applying federal law).
155
Vill. of Bensenville v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 457 F.3d 52, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2006); O’Bryan
v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210,
1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959–60 (10th Cir. 2001); In re Young,
141 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 1998).
156
Plank, supra note 151, at 635–36.
157
See id. at 635–36.
158
In re Young, 141 F.3d at 854.
159
See Susan D. Franck, Comment, Christians v. Chrystal Evangelical Free Church:
Interpreting RFRA in the Battle Among God, the Government, and the Bankruptcy Code, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 981, 983 (1997) (“The Eighth Circuit is the first circuit court to evaluate the
application of RFRA in relation to tithing, bankruptcy, and fraudulent conveyance law.”)
(citing In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 1416 (8th Cir. 1996)). See Iru C. Lupu, The Case Against
Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 587–588 n.90 (1990)
(“Bankruptcy legislation enacted in 1998 provides religion-neutral protection for gifts by
insolvent debtors to charitable institutions, including religious entities.”) (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2)(1994)). While the tithing question has since been resolved, the RFRA
considerations at issue have not. Id.
160
In re Young, 141 F.3d. at 857.
151
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7 of the Bankruptcy Code.161 At that point, the bankruptcy trustee
sought to avoid the Youngs’s pre-petition tithes under 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2)(A), the fraudulent-conveyance provision of the Code.162 In
response, the church that received the tithes, and was now being sued,
raised a defense to such action based on RFRA.163 The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that RFRA applied to this federal law.164
In attempting to understand this holding, some emphasis should be
placed on the court’s conclusion.165 The court explicitly declared “we
conclude that, under the Bankruptcy Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause of Article I of the Constitution, RFRA is constitutional as
applied to federal law.”166 Despite this broad statement, the Young court
did not openly address the issue of whether its holding would extend to
Code provisions that apply state law.167 Nevertheless, this opinion
clearly demonstrates the foresight of several circuits in enforcing RFRA
against the federal government prior to the Gonzalez decision.168
In reaching its decision, the Young court first noted the distinct
holding of Flores in comparison with the precise issue before it.169 On
this point, the court stated that Flores dealt with Congress’s remedial
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, not Congress’s

Id.
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 861 (“We conclude that RFRA is an appropriate means by Congress to modify
the United States bankruptcy laws. . . . RFRA, however, has effectively amended the
Bankruptcy Code, and has engrafted the additional clause to § 548(a)(2)(A) that a recovery
that places a substantial burden on a debtor’s exercise of religion will not be allowed unless
it is the least restrictive means to satisfy a compelling governmental interest.”) (citation
omitted).
165
For example, the Court stated that “[t]he key to the separation of powers issue [here]
is . . . not whether Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis,
but whether Congress acted beyond the scope of its constitutional authority in applying
RFRA to federal law.” Id. at 860.
166
Id. at 856.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 860; Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Likewise, we do not
see how, by enacting RFRA for the federal sphere, Congress violates the separation of
powers doctrine. The sweeping language used in Boerne derived from the Court’s
discussion of Congress’s exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority, but
when Congress is acting pursuant to its plenary power, it has the ability, and duty, to
legislate according to its own interpretation of the Constitution.”) (citation omitted);
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2001) (“These separation of powers
concerns the Court expressed in Flores, however, do not apply to RFRA as applied to the
federal government. Congress’[s] power to apply RFRA to the federal government comes
not from its ability to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment but rather from its Article I
powers.”).
169
In re Young, 141 F.3d at 858–59.
161
162
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bankruptcy power.170 More importantly, the court stated that Flores
positively reflected the conclusion that Congress had its own spheres of
authority where it maintained dominion to determine controlling
constitutional principles.171
In addition, the Young court also focused on Congress’s broad intent
in protecting religious liberty when it enacted RFRA.172 Here, the court
stated that such broad intent demonstrates that Congress wanted to
maintain RFRA’s validity as to the federal government, even if it did not
apply to state governments.173 To the Young court, the combination of
Congress’s broad intent and its bankruptcy power provided a basis to
conclude that RFRA still applied to the federal government;174 Gonzalez
later confirmed the Young court’s prescient intuition.
In applying this reasoning, the Young court eluded to the Flores
Court’s separation of powers rationale by asserting that the true issue in
separation of powers cases is not that Congress’s opinion of Free
Exercise differed from the Court’s, but that Congress had constitutional
authority to enact RFRA as to the federal government.175 In dealing with
Flores, based on this distinction, the court held that Congress had full
authority to apply RFRA to bankruptcy proceedings.176
In sum, the Young court articulated two points. First, it stated that
Flores’ separation of powers rationale did not extend to areas in which
Congress had final constitutional authority.177 Second, it reasoned that
Congress’s plenary power over bankruptcy provided it with the
requisite authority to amend bankruptcy law by passing RFRA without
actually amending the Bankruptcy Code.178
In viewing the second rationale, it may appear that its natural
extension is the untenable proposition that Congress, upon taking broad
remedial action, effectively amends every area of federal law controlled
under the scope of its Article I powers.179 Initially, this assertion may
seem contradictory considering Congress’s purported source of
authority for RFRA and the intrinsic nature of Federalism which
mandates that Congress operate as a creature constrained by the
Id.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (“When Congress acts within its
sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own
informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”).
172
In re Young, 141 F.3d at 859.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 860.
176
Id. at 861.
177
Id. at 860.
178
Id. at 861.
179
See id.
170
171
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principles of limited government.180 It is this Article’s position, however,
that this apparent contradiction is resolved when one reconciles Young
with other relevant case law.
For example, the case of In re Hodge181 arises from the same factual
circumstance as Young. In Hodge, a Chapter 7 trustee attempted to avoid
pre-petition tithes to the debtor’s church as fraudulent conveyances.182
Again, the court rejected this argument.183 In its opinion, the court
reasoned that Congress had the authority to amend the Bankruptcy
Code and other specific areas of federal law.184 It stated that no one
would challenge the assertion that Congress could individually amend
each federal statute if it so desired.185 In respect of that power, the court
found no justification to prevent Congress from accomplishing, in a
comprehensive manner, what it could effectuate on a per-statute basis.186
Thus, the Hodge court augmented Young’s holding by adding the
principle that Congress can fail to state certain authority to support its
enactment of legislation and still apply that legislation in the exercise of
its enumerated Article I powers.187
180
H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (stating that Congress has the constitutional authority
to enact H.R. 1308 [RFRA]. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Necessary and Proper Clause embodied in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the
legislative branch has been given the authority to provide statutory protection for a
constitutional value when the Supreme Court has been unwilling to assert its authority). In
reviewing the above language, one should notice that the only Article I clause cited as
support for RFRA’s enactment is the Necessary and Proper Clause. Perhaps, Congress
might have been better positioned to enact RFRA if they had identified the specific Article I
powers involved. If Congress had done so, an argument would exist that the result in
Boerne should mirror the result in McCulloch v. Maryland. In that case, the congressional
action of establishing national banks was declared constitutional because the litigants could
relate the subject legislation to additional Article I powers besides the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The powers involved were: the taxing power, the borrowing power, the
spending power, and the power to raise and support an army. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 364 (1819).
181
220 B.R. 386, 389 (D. Idaho 1998).
182
Id. at 389.
183
Id. at 398 (“The question of constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not
depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise. Regardless of the absence
of such recitals in a statute’s legislative history, it will be upheld so long as Congress had
authority as an objective matter to enact it.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. Under these standards, it is certainly within the power of Congress under the
Bankruptcy Clause to amend the Bankruptcy Code to ensure that it provides the level of
protection th[at] Congress deems adequate for free-exercise rights. Id. Accordingly, the
Court holds that RFRA, as applied in this instance, is a proper exercise of Congress’s power
under the Bankruptcy Clause. Id.
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The Attack on Flores

Apart from the post-Flores decisions cited above, a proper factual
perspective, a proper reading of Flores, and thoughtful consideration of
the unique nature of the Bankruptcy Clause support the application of
RFRA to bankruptcy law. First, it cannot be disputed that as a matter of
fact, a bankruptcy judge is a federal actor, regardless of whether the
court is charged with the task of applying federal or state law.188 To
accept the idea that a bankruptcy judge somehow transforms from a
federal to state actor by applying state law is to basically accept the
argument that a traditional Article III judge becomes a non-federal actor
when he or she applies state law in diversity cases.189 Instead, it is easier
to concede that the judge is a federal actor who is just facilitating federal
duties through the use of state law.190
This conclusion is supported by consideration of Flores and its
potential application to bankruptcy. In Flores, Justice Kennedy focused
both on federalism and separation of powers issues.191 Justice Kennedy
briefly expressed concern about the burden that RFRA would place on
the state actor’s inherent right to regulate its citizens, and that Congress
had essentially abrogated the Marbury power by creating a statutory
cause of action.192 However, our assertion is that these two rationales do
not present the same problem in bankruptcy.
First, federalism does not bar RFRA’s application. In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Kennedy’s articulated federalism protest to RFRA
must be considered. On this point, he wrote that RFRA “would require
searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of
invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the
States’ traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate . . . their
citizens.”193 A fair reading of this passage reveals that Justice Kennedy’s
See Plank, supra note 151, at 633–36.
32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 398 (2006) (articulating the Erie doctrine, which holds
that a federal judge is required to apply substantive rights provided by state law when
deciding state-law claims).
190
A perfect example of this principle is found in further examination of the Erie
Doctrine. For instance, if a case involves a federal interest of the highest order, an Article
III judge is required to apply federal substantive law when deciding diversity cases—even
if the cause of action involved is based solely on state law. Id. Similar to Article III judges,
the bankruptcy court often uses its equitable powers to craft supreme federal law. Levitin,
supra note 122, at 78–82 (collecting examples of the bankruptcy court using its equitable
power to create federal common law).
191
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“Broad as the power of Congress is
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”).
192
Id. at 533–36.
193
Id. at 534.
188
189
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main concern was the administrative burden that RFRA places on state
regulatory schemes.194
However, this concern does not extend to bankruptcy because
Congress’s regulatory scheme is burdened by RFRA, not the scheme of a
particular state.195 Section 541 is a perfect example of this principle
because, under that section, if a debtor successfully excludes property
from the bankruptcy estate, the Bankruptcy Code’s fundamental aim of
centralizing the debtor’s property interests, rather than a state’s interest,
is undermined.196 Therefore, RFRA poses no threat to state regulatory
schemes.
In addition, separation of powers does not present an obstacle to the
application of RFRA to bankruptcy cases. This assertion derives from
Congress’s unique powers over bankruptcy law.197 Just as the Young
court noted, Congress has plenary authority over this matter and can
dictate controlling standards within it.198
Further, there is a unique history behind the Bankruptcy Power that
supports the construction of a different relationship between Congress
and the judiciary.199 Thus, the final pages of this Article articulate the
significant reasons why bankruptcy proceedings present this unique
relationship.
3.

Constitutional Support for Considering Congress More Powerful
Under the Bankruptcy Clause

The investigation into constitutional support for this altered
relationship begins at the relevant constitutional text. Article I, § 8, cl. 4
of the United States Constitution provides: “Congress shall have
power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States[.]”200 In reviewing this provision, it is
important to note the exact language used and how that language
implicates a powerful congressional status. Specifically, the reader

See id.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
196
RESNICK & SOMMER, supra note 5, at § 541.01.
197
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (“The power of Congress to establish
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States is unrestricted
and paramount.”).
198
In Re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
941 (1983)).
199
Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy is Different, 77 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 129, 129 (2003) (arguing that Congress has a broader power under the Bankruptcy
Clause to abrogate sovereign immunity than other Article I powers).
200
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
194
195
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should pay attention to words such as “to establish” and “uniform[.]”201
Together, these words suggest that the Constitution contemplates
Congress’s role in bankruptcy to be more active than that of a mere
regulator; rather, the Constitution imbues Congress with express rulemaking power.202
A review of the language of the Commerce Clause supports this
assertion. This Clause, located just one provision above the Bankruptcy
Clause, provides: Congress shall “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States[.]”203 Comparing this text with
the Bankruptcy Clause, there is an obvious difference between the two.204
In dealing with commerce, the Framers stated a clear intention that
Congress act as a regulator by using the word “regulate[,]”205 while the
Framers used much stronger language when defining the Congressional
Bankruptcy Power.206 To disregard this contrast, in light of the reality
that the Framers contemporaneously constructed both powers,207 is to
accept the proposition that powers located only a clause apart from each
other, with markedly different language, grant the same scope of
authority.208
In addition to the constitutional text, further support for a broad
bankruptcy power can be located in the unique purpose and history of
bankruptcy law. Unlike other Article I powers, bankruptcy was
intended to be an exclusively federal field.209 In part, this exclusivity was
Id.
Haines, supra note 199, at 166–67.
203
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
204
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3–4.
205
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
206
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
207
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 221 (James Madison) (Gideon ed. 2001). James Madison
stated that
[t]he power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so
intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will
prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or
be removed into different states, that the expediency of it seems not
likely to be drawn into question.
Id. As the Madison passage demonstrates, the Founder’s understanding of the relationship
between the bankruptcy and commerce powers, in addition to their choice of different
language in defining these powers, signifies that the two powers are to be interpreted
differently. Naturally, given the powerful language of the Bankruptcy Clause, our
argument is that this clause be subject to a broad interpretation.
208
Even the father of judicial review, John Marshall, noted the distinctive text of the
Bankruptcy Clause. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 193–94 (1819) (“The peculiar
terms of the [bankruptcy clause] certainly deserve notice. Congress is not authorized
merely to pass laws, the operation of which shall be uniform, but to establish uniform laws
on the subject throughout the United States.”).
209
Levitin, supra note 122, at 71–72.
201
202
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necessary where the Framer’s could not garner enough full faith and
credit to ensure that the colonies would respect one another’s insolvency
laws.210 This conflict arose when one colony granted a debtor a
discharge from his obligations and another colony would imprison the
discharged debtor for failure to pay debts to its citizens.211 To provide
uniformity, the Framers, through the Constitution, empowered
Congress, via the Bankruptcy Clause, to pave the way for matters of
insolvency to be decided exclusively in the federal courts.212
Early on, Congress used this power in a unique manner. For
example, immediately after the Constitution was adopted, Congress
granted federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to
release debtors from state prisons.213 In comparison, the habeas right
was not offered to other state prisoners for another half century.214 This
historical point is important because it demonstrates the flexibility that
Congress possesses in exercising its bankruptcy power.215
As a final point, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a
stronger congressional role in bankruptcy law. For instance, in Central
Virginia Community College v. Katz,216 the Court deferred a valuable
constitutional question to congressional discretion. In Katz, various state
institutions were sued for receiving preferential transfers from an
insolvent debtor.217 Later, when that same debtor filed for bankruptcy,
the United State’s Trustee initiated a suit to recover the payments
already distributed.218 The state institutions raised a sovereign immunity
defense.219 However, the Court rejected this defense.220
In reviewing the Court’s decision, the final paragraph of the
majority’s opinion is worthy of discussion. There, Justice Stevens stated:
Congress may, at its option, either treat States in the
same way as other creditors insofar as concerns “Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies” or exempt them from
See Haines, supra note 199, at 152–57.
Id. at 155.
212
Id. at 156.
213
Central Virginia. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1002–03 (2006) (“[I]t [America’s
bankruptcy law] specifically granted federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas
corpus effective to release debtors from state prisons.”).
214
Id. at 1003.
215
See Haines, supra note 199, at 152–57.
216
Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1005 (holding that the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I abrogates state
sovereign immunity).
217
Id. at 994.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 995.
220
Id. at 1002.
210
211
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operation of such laws. Its power to do so arises from
the Bankruptcy Clause itself; the relevant “abrogation”
is the one effected in the plan of the Convention, not by
statute.221
A thorough reading of this passage reveals that the Court deferred
the sovereign immunity question, one traditionally determined by the
judiciary,222 to Congressional discretion.223 This deference to Congress
demonstrates that the Court was receptive to the position that Congress
has the power to decide matters of constitutional law in the bankruptcy
setting.224
Second, it is also significant that the Court derived its decision from
the construction of the Constitution.225 The Court implied that the
founding document vests Congress with controlling constitutional
authority in this area.226 In other words, the Court recognized that
Congress is the constitutional head of matters concerning bankruptcy
law.227
V. CONCLUSION
In summation, there are two cognizable grounds to support the
assertion that bankruptcy judges must apply heightened scrutiny to
church property decisions. First, the bankruptcy court itself is a system
of individualized exemptions in which a governmental decision maker,
the bankruptcy judge, is vested with wide discretion to grant exemptions
to certain individuals. Second, RFRA is valid in its application to the
federal government even when a judge utilizes state law in the
effectuation of federal duties. The fact that federal judges may be called
Id. at 1005.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 (1996) (citations omitted) (citing
the origins of the Court’s sovereign immunity doctrine).
223
See Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1005.
224
Id.
225
Id. (“[Congress’s] power to [abrogate sovereign immunity] arises from the Bankruptcy
Clause itself; the relevant ‘abrogation’ is the one effected in the plan of the Convention, not
by statute.”).
226
See id.
227
See Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1002. As additional support for its holding, the Katz Court relied
on the core nature of a preference action to bankruptcy proceedings stating, “Petitioners do
not dispute that that authority[, power of bankruptcy courts to avoid preferences,] has been
a core aspect of the administration of bankrupt estates since at least the 18th century.” Id.
The authors would assert that this statement buttresses the theory that decisions in other
core areas of bankruptcy, such as what interests of the debtor are included in the estate
property under 11 U.S.C. § 541, must also be within Congress’s final constitutional
discretion.
221
222
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upon to apply state law is not a compelling reason to prevent the
application of RFRA to bankruptcy judges. Arguments to the contrary
negate the very nature of Congress’s broad powers under the
Bankruptcy Clause.
In closing, the authors recognize that some people may be reluctant
to extend strong protection to the Roman Catholic Church—or any
religious entity—in view of the circumstances that surround the entity’s
bankruptcy proceedings. However, the factual predicate of this case
must not confuse our legal thought. Here, bankruptcy courts have been
presented with bona fide debtors constrained by the mistakes of their
past. This is exactly the type of case the bankruptcy system was
designed to address.
Ultimately, the aforementioned proposal is preferable because it
allows the entity to attain the benefits of this system without requiring it
to sacrifice all semblances of internal autonomy. In any event, if dioceses
are forced to cease operations, it is not the entity that will be most
harshly affected; rather, it is the entity’s congregation who will no longer
be able to fulfill the mission of that organization which will bear the
brunt of these potential distributions. Considering the number of people
who would be affected if a diocese was required to distribute all its
assets to satisfy debts, it makes sense for a tort-creditor to bear the
burden of proving a compelling justification for enforcing the debt
before he or she holds a great number of innocent individuals
responsible for the harm caused by a few.
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